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Abstract— * We propose an artificial immune model for 
intrusion detection in distributed systems based on a relatively 
recent theory in immunology called Danger theory. Based on 
Danger theory, immune response in natural systems is a result 
of sensing corruption as well as sensing unknown substances. 
In contrast, traditional self-nonself discrimination theory states 
that immune response is only initiated by sensing nonself 
(unknown) patterns. Danger theory solves many problems that 
could only be partially explained by the traditional model.
Although the traditional model is simpler, such problems 
result in high false positive rates in immune-inspired intrusion 
detection systems. We believe using danger theory in a multi-
agent environment that computationally emulates the behavior 
of natural immune systems is effective in reducing false 
positive rates. We first describe a simplified scenario of 
immune response in natural systems based on danger theory 
and then, convert it to a computational model as a network 
protocol. In our protocol, we define several immune signals 
and model cell signaling via message passing between agents 
that emulate cells. Most messages include application-specific 
patterns that must be meaningfully extracted from various 
system properties. We show how to model these messages in
practice by performing a case study on the problem of 
detecting distributed denial-of-service attacks in wireless 
sensor networks. We conduct a set of systematic experiments to 
find a set of performance metrics that can accurately 
distinguish malicious patterns. The results indicate that the 
system can be efficiently used to detect malicious patterns with 
a high level of accuracy.
Keywords. Artificial immune systems; danger theory;
distributed algorithms; intrusion detection systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Data and tasks in large-scale distributed systems are 
often enormously large that requires us to break them into 
tolerable pieces and placing them on various nodes. On the 
other hand, fragmentation and distribution of data and tasks 
over the network produces excessive overhead leading to 
reduction in performance and unavailability of data and 
tasks. This leads us to compromise between locality and 
distribution and maximize the locality to suppress 
intemperance in fragmentation [2]. 
                                                          
*A shorter version of this paper is published in the International Conference 
on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS), Beijing, China, 2009.
Natural immune system is a distributed system that 
greatly balances locality and distribution. It consists of a vast 
number of cells performing their tasks concurrently and 
interacting with each other in various ways. The localized 
inter-cell interactions result in expression of complicated 
behaviors across the system that provide scalability and 
robustness. This fact has played an important role in 
motivating computer researchers in the last two decades to 
develop efficient distributed systems based on the structure 
and behavior of natural immune systems. Artificial immune 
systems (AIS) are computationally intelligent systems based 
on the behavior of the natural immune system. In other 
words, AIS are adaptive systems inspired by theoretical 
immunology and observed immune functions, principles and 
models, which are applied to complex problem domains. The 
AIS algorithms and models typically exploit the immune 
system’s characteristics such as learning, memory and 
ubiquitousness to solve a complicated problem.
Intrusion detection is the process of dynamically 
monitoring events occurring in a computer system or 
network, analyzing them for signs of possible incidents and 
often interdicting the unauthorized access [21]. This is 
typically accomplished by automatically collecting 
information from a variety of systems and network sources, 
and then analyzing the information for possible security 
problems. Traditional intrusion detection and prevention 
techniques, like firewalls, access control mechanisms, and 
cryptography, have several limitations in fully protecting 
networks and systems from increasingly sophisticated 
attacks like denial of service. Moreover, most systems built 
based on such techniques suffer from high false positive and 
false negative detection rates and the lack of continuously 
adapting to changing malicious behaviors. An intrusion 
detection system (IDS) generally has to deal with problems 
such as large network traffic volumes, highly uneven data 
distribution, the difficulty to realize decision boundaries 
between normal and abnormal behavior, and a requirement 
for continuous adaptation to a constantly changing 
environment. In general, the challenge is to efficiently 
capture and classify various behaviors in a computer 
network.
A. Our Contribution
We design a general-purpose AIS inspired by several 
well-known immunological models that can be used for 
solving the intrusion detection problem. The main natural 
model we use is called danger theory, a relatively recent and 
strong model that explains many questions, which could, at 
best, be partially answered by the traditional self-nonself 
discrimination theory. In the simplest form, danger theory 
suggests that a natural immune response is the result of 
sensing danger in the system rather than detecting foreign 
symptoms of the cause, which is the basis of the self-nonself 
discrimination theory.
Although our model can be applied to any classification 
problem, several details remain to be defined by the specific 
application. We will show that one requires modeling several 
immune signals for knowledge representation as the patterns
used in classification of data. Modeling immune signals is a 
delicate task and often requires several experiments to 
extract meaningful features of data.
In our previous work [24], we proposed an IDS model 
based on danger theory that is resilient to denial of service 
attacks in wireless sensor networks. We conducted pure 
optimization tests and applied experiments for detecting 
misbehaviors in wireless sensor networks. Wallenta et 
al. [22] and [16] proposed a similar work using the dendritic 
cell algorithm (DCA) for wireless sensor networks inspired 
by the Danger Theory. They argue that a general 
vulnerability in sensor network protocols is due to an interest 
cache with limited size. Although they analyzed the problem 
in detail and proposed an effective method accompanied by 
experiments, their model was only aimed at detecting attacks 
in wireless sensor networks. Our work is, however, different 
in many aspects. First, our model can be used for designing 
IDS for any distributed system. Second, our model is 
inspired by a more comprehensive immunity scenario 
described by the danger theory, not only the dendritic cells 
behavior. In our model, we have incorporated the behaviors 
of lymphocytes and dendritic cells in several tissues, e.g., 
clonal selection in lymph nodes and negative selection in 
thymuses. Second, we model communications that happen 
among various immune cells naturally performed via cell 
signaling. We believe these communications result in very 
sophisticated cooperation among the cells and are essential in 
detection of malicious behaviors.
In our protocol, we model immune signals as messages 
that can be exchanged between protocol agents. We show 
how to define these messages in practice by performing a set 
of statistical experiments on a wireless sensor network 
simulation. We conduct our experiments using fractional 
factorial design [12], a well-known performance evaluation 
technique used to minimize the number of experiments 
required to extract meaningful features.
B. Paper Organization
Section II covers the required background on 
immunology. Section III is a review of important related 
work. In section IV, we precisely define the assumptions 
required for our protocol to work. In section V, we propose 
our immune-inspired protocol. In this section, we convert the 
immune system scenario of section II into a computational 
model.
II. NATURAL IMMUNE SYSTEMS
In this section, we describe the preliminaries required for 
understanding our model. Readers familiar with natural 
immune systems can skip this section.
Natural immune system consists of molecules, cells, and 
tissues that establish body’s resistance to infection and 
inhibitory of decay agents in a complex fashion. 
Lymphocytes are white blood cells that play major roles in 
the immune system. They consist of two groups of small 
cells called T-cells and B-cells that form the adaptive 
immune system, the highly specialized immunity of 
vertebrates. Lymphocytes have receptors on their surface that 
are molecular structures (patterns) capable of binding to 
surface structures of other cells and antigens. Antigens are 
any molecular structure that can bind to lymphocyte 
receptors. An antigen that pertains to the body is called self-
antigen [1]. Surface patterns of cell may become specific to 
antigenic patterns through selection processes. Once a 
sufficient number of an antigen is detected by the immune 
system, B-cells and a group of T-cells called killer T-cells 
(TK) start the process of destroying the antigens. B-cells 
generate antigen-specific antibodies and release them in 
blood. Antibodies circulate the body and destroy pathogens 
they match with. In a similar process, killer T-cells adapt to 
pathogenic patterns and destroy the infected cells [19].
T-cells and B-cells are formed and matured in thymus
and bone marrow respectively. Two important theories of 
immunology explain how lymphocytes mature and 
proliferate themselves. Based on the negative selection
theory, immature cells with randomly generated molecular 
patterns are exposed to body cells. If they match the cells 
with a high affinity, they are condemned to death. After 
several attempts, a set of self-tolerated mature detector cells 
are generated. Based on the clonal selection theory, if the 
receptors of a lymphocyte match the molecular patterns on 
the surface of an antigen, the lymphocyte is activated to 
proliferate itself rapidly giving rise to selection of certain 
type of lymphocyte that is specific to the invading 
antigen [1].
Once the negative selection process is completed, mature 
lymphocytes migrate to lymph nodes; a special type of 
immune organs distributed across the body, where external 
antigens activate lymphocytes and the adaptive immune 
response is stimulated. Lymph nodes are connected to each 
other through a vascular system of lymphatic vessels. The 
major role of lymphatic vessels is transporting immune cells 
to and from lymph nodes.
In contrast to adaptive immune system, innate immune 
system is inherited from invertebrates and is basic and 
nonspecific. Innate immune system provides powerful and 
vital defense against infectious materials and plays a 
fundamental role in triggering adaptive immune response. 
On the other hand, adaptive immune system uses many of 
innate immune system mechanisms to remove detected 
infections. Generally, adaptive immune systems provide a 
slower but more precise defense to pathogens. Dendritic 
cells (DCs), macrophages, and B-cells are innate immune 
cells that can engulf unknown pathogens and break them 
down into simple antigenic pieces called peptides. Due to 
their ability in presenting antigenic patterns to lymphocytes, 
these cells are known as antigen-presenting cells (APCs). 
They also have special receptors on their surface, called 
pattern recognition receptors (PRRs) that play an important 
role in triggering innate immune response and consequently, 
adaptive immunity [19].
Immune cells can communicate with each other in 
various ways. They may have either direct surface contacts 
or indirect chemical secretion contacts [9]. The former 
occurs when two cells collide and are capable of stimulating 
each other. In the latter way, a secreted chemical affects the 
cells in the near proximity of the generator, which have 
receptors sensitive to it. Secretive immune signals are called 
cytokines and encompass a large family of signals with 
different meanings [1].
B-cells and killer T-cells are only activated when an 
additional signal called help signal is generated near them by 
a group of T-cells called helper T-cell or TH * . It is also 
discovered that in order to generate the help signal, TH
requires a signal called co-stimulation generated by APCs. 
An APC is initially inactive and is activated by pathogen-
associated molecular patterns (PAMP) that are sensed by its 
PRR.
For many years, immunologists used the self-nonself 
discrimination model to explain the reaction of immune 
                                                          
* Similar to killer T-cells, helper T-cells are also a heterogeneous group of 
T-cells.
system against pathogenic invasions. Based on the model, 
the immune system should learn to distinguish foreign 
materials from its own. The model is, unfortunately, unable 
to explain several observations. For example, it cannot 
explain why a self-cell remains self even though it changes 
throughout its life or why our bodies do not start any 
immune response against the foods we eat although they are 
actually foreign materials [18]. With an attempt to explain 
these, Matzinger [17] proposed a new model called danger 
theory where immune response is initiated as a result of 
sensing danger besides strange antigenic patterns. In other 
words, the simultaneity of foreign antigens and danger 
signals is crucial for initiation of immune response. 
Matzinger explains that any sign of abnormal cell death that 
is released around a cell can be regarded as danger signal. 
Danger, co-stimulation and help signals are generated 
sequentially and upon lack of any, the next signal and 
consequently the immune response would not start. Figure 1 
shows the scenario of immune response based on danger 
theory. Five phases shown in the figure indicate the sequence 
of events:
1. In a local tissue†, bacteria enter the body and viruses 
infect body cells‡ and change their normal behavior.
2. Infected body cells release substances such as cell 
internal contents that act as danger signals. These 
substances stimulate dendritic cells that are present 
in the local tissue. Dendritic cells detect PAMPs on 
the surface of bacteria using their PRRs and engulf 
the corresponding antigens.
                                                          
† By tissue, we mean any part of the body that consists of an aggregate of 
cells having a similar structure and function. By local tissue we mean any 
tissue that is vulnerable to infections by bacteria or viruses.
‡ Bacteria are unicellular living organisms while viruses are non-living 
organisms that are made of groups of RNAs or DNAs.
Figure 1. Immune response based on danger theory. Activated by danger and pathogenic signals, a dendritic cell migrates to a lymph node, where T-
cells and B-cells exist. The dendritic cells, then, present pathogenic patterns to the lymphocytes and secrete co-stimulation signals to stimulates helper T-
cells (TH), which trigger immune response via killer T-cells (TK) and B-cells to destroy infected cells.
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3. Dendritic cells analyze the antigens and break them 
up into peptides. They present the peptides on 
surface and migrate to lymph nodes, where 
lymphocytes exist.
4. Presented antigens stimulate matching T-cells. 
Meanwhile, dendritic cells express co-stimulatory 
molecules on their surface in proportion to the 
amount of danger and PAMP signals.
5. T-cells have molecules on their surface that can be 
stimulated by the co-stimulation molecules.
6. Activated T-cells proliferate and differentiate via 
clonal selection to precisely match the triggering 
antigenic patterns. Helper T-cells (TH) release help 
signals to activate killer T-cells (TK) and B-cells, 
which have already been stimulated by similar 
pathogens.
III. RELATED WORK
Farmer et al. [5] proposed the first immune-inspired 
model. Inspired by the immune network theory they 
represented the dynamic behavior of the immune system by a 
set of differential equations and showed that they can be 
efficiently applied to learning problems. Forrest et al. [6]
proposed the first immunological approach to computer 
security problems. Their work was fundamentally based on 
the self-nonself discrimination theory of immunology, which 
is based on the negative selection theory. Their approach was 
anomaly-based and they applied a simple computer model of 
negative selection as a change detector to the virus detection 
application. Despite many advantages of their scheme, it has 
some computational difficulties especially an exponential 
cost for detector generation.
Kephart proposed one of the earliest artificial immune 
systems for intrusion detection, which was to detect 
computer viruses and worms [14]. His method was a 
combination of signature and anomaly-based IDS with decoy 
programs that produced a set of antibodies to detect 
previously known viruses and some integrity monitors to 
detect changes to programs and data using checksums.
Hofmeyr and Forrest [11] proposed the first distributed AIS 
applicable to various computer security problems. Their 
model is specialized to detect intrusions in local area 
networks. Each TCP connection is modeled by a triple, 
which encodes address of sender, address of receiver and 
port number of the receiver. Detectors are generated 
randomly through negative selection. In addition, they used a 
second signal called co-stimulation to confirm the anomaly 
that was detected via negative selection. In this system, a 
human is required to generate this signal manually in order to 
reduce false alarms (autoimmunity) of the system.
Kim and Bentley [15], assess the similarities between 
network-based IDSs and the human immune systems. They 
describe seven requirements of network IDSs: robustness, 
configurability, extendibility, scalability, adaptability, global 
analysis, and efficiency. They explain that the human 
immune system is distributed through immune networks and 
it generates unique antibody sets to provide the first four 
requirements. It is self-organized through gene library 
evolution, negative selection, and clonal. Finally, it is 
lightweight through approximate binding, memory cells, and 
gene expression to increase efficiency.
The first multi-agent IDS based on AIS was first 
proposed by Dasgupta [3] and then was continued in many 
other works like [10] and [23]. Dasgupta [3] defines three 
types of agents: monitoring agents that roam around the 
network and monitor various parameters simultaneously at 
multiple levels (user to packet level), communicator agents
that are used to play the role of immune signals and 
decision/action agents to make decisions based on collected 
local warning signals. Harmer et al. [10], defined an agent-
based architecture that maps required computer security 
elements to the immunological domain. Several matching 
rules for measuring affinity between detector strings and 
unknown strings are presented and analyzed. Like previous 
models, nonself strings are generated through negative 
selection. To overcome the problem of imperfect detector 
strings, helper agents ask for co-stimulation as a second 
confirmation signal, which should be generated manually by 
an administrator to reduce false-positive errors. One of the 
disadvantages of this model is that the main immune 
scenario does not perfectly match the natural one. Based on 
biological findings, antibodies are released from a 
differentiated type of activated B-cells after the clonal 
selection process. B-cells are activated by helper T-cells that 
are previously activated via co-stimulation. Greensmith et 
al. [7] and [8] suggested a novel anomaly detection algorithm 
inspired by functionalities of dendritic cells. They abstracted 
dendritic cells as signal processors that convert three input 
signals received by the cell to one output signal. The signals 
are based on the discoveries about biological concentration 
levels.
In 2005, Sarafijanovic and Boudec [20], developed an 
AIS for detection of misbehaving nodes in mobile ad-hoc 
networks. In these networks, nodes can be used as both hosts 
and routers and misbehaving node is the one that disobeys 
routing protocol. Misbehaving nodes participate in the 
routing process and drop routing control packets with a 
determinable probability. To discriminate between well-
behaving and misbehaving nodes, a group of events related 
to the sent and received packets in a discrete time interval are 
labeled and collected in a sequence to form the antigens. 
Several routing protocol events in a discrete time interval are 
labeled and collected in a sequence to form the antigens. 
Mature detectors produced via negative selection monitor the 
network traffic. Once a match is occurred, the detector goes 
into a clonal selection algorithm and proliferates itself 
quickly. Danger signals are not used in this model; however, 
the authors recommend them to fortify the model. They 
suggest defining danger signals as network performance 
indicators such as packet loss and delay.
IV. MODEL
We assume the distributed system is composed of several 
nodes that are connected via a synchronous network with all-
to-all communication * . We also assume that at most a 
constant fraction of nodes is controlled by an adversary who 
uses the nodes to attack the network. We say that the nodes
controlled by the adversary are bad and that the remaining 
nodes are good meaning that they strictly follow our 
protocol. For simplicity, we assume that the adversary cannot 
attack our protocol in any way but it can attack any other part 
of the system. We also assume that the adversary is static
meaning that it must select the set of bad parties at the start 
of the protocol.
V. OUR PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe a multi-agent protocol for 
intrusion detection in distributed systems based by the 
immune system scenario described in section II. We define 
two types of agents denoted by and corresponding to T-
cell and Dendritic cell respectively. For simplicity in this 
paper, we only consider the problem of passive intrusion 
detection and we leave possible reactive strategies as a future 
work. Thus, we do not model the behaviors of B-cells and 
killer T-cells as they provide reactive immunity. We also 
define four types of nodes denoted by , , , and
that correspond to the four types of tissues involved in the 
immune scenario respectively: thymus, bone marrow, lymph 
node, and local tissue. In a setup phase, three nodes are 
elected to play the roles of , , and . The rest of the 
nodes play the role of . At each round of the protocol, 
each node possesses a set of agents. Each agent is associated 
with a sequence of bits denoted by † that is generated 
uniformly at randomly when the agent is first created in . 
agents born at a are initially immature and are matured 
in via the negative selection algorithm [6]. is the 
place where activated agents gather to activate agents. 
To improve performance and availability, several nodes 
can be created and distributed across the system.
A. Modeling Cell Signaling
In order to model cell signaling in our protocol, we let 
each agent to probabilistically communicate with other 
agents that are in the same node it belongs. In other words, a 
message sent by an agent is delivered to a recipient with 
probability p that is a parameter of our protocol. To model 
the propagation of natural immune signals, each agent 
chooses a set of t agents from the node it belongs uniformly 
at random, where t is a parameter of our protocol. The 
agent, then, sends its message (signal) to each of the t
                                                          
* Direct physical all-to-all links are not necessary. An overlay network 
providing all-to-all communication suffices.
† recalls molecular pattern. In immunology, it is a sequence of 
molecules on the surface of immune cells that bind to antigens.
agents with probability p . We simulate both types of cell 
signaling (i.e., secretion and direct contact) with the same 
method described above.
B. Modeling Immune Signals
We model immune signals with messages that can be 
transmitted between agents. For simplicity, we only model 
three types of signals involved in the immune scenario 
shown in Fig 1: PAMP, danger, and co-stimulation. Recall 
that PAMP is a pattern associated with the molecules on a 
cell’s surface. We model such a pattern with a multi-
dimensional feature vector that we call Antigenic Molecular 
Pattern (AMP). Both self and pathogenic patterns are 
modeled via AMP. AMPs must be extracted from 
application-specific events occurring in the system and made 
self-tolerant via the negative selection algorithm of [6] in 
or . This implies that a set of normal AMPs are necessary 
to train agents.
We model a danger signal via a multi-dimensional
feature vector that we call Danger Molecular Pattern 
(DMP). Although DMP is a type of signal, it is not directly 
sent by any agent and it is rather detected by agents. We 
explain this more when we model agents later in this 
section. When modeling AMP and DMP in practice, it is 
crucial to remember the important difference between them:
an AMP must reflect a sign of known malicious behavior but
DMP must indicate symptoms of corruption that are not 
necessarily correlated with malicious patterns (i.e., AMPs). 
This plays an important role in reducing false positive rate of 
our protocol.
Recall that in natural immune systems, co-stimulation is 
a signal generated by dendritic cells to trigger TH cells and is 
required in addition to antigen-specific PAMP signals to 
activate TH. Unlike PAMPs, co-stimulation signals do not 
carry any antigenic patterns and consist of only one type of 
protein‡. Hence, we model the co-stimulation signal with a 
message that only contains one field indicating the 
concentration (power) of co-stimulatory molecules§.
C. Modeling Dendritic Cells
For simplicity, we only model dendritic cells as the only 
type APC in our protocol. We model dendritic cells via 
agent. Once a D agent receives a message, it analyzes the 
associated AMP using an application-specific multi-
dimensional classifier to determine whether the AMP is 
pathogenic or not.
In addition to AMP, agents can detect and analyze
DMPs. Each agent that is in an , always scans certain 
properties of the system to extract DMPs and detect 
corruption to the system. This means that agent requires a 
                                                          
‡ APCs express a type of protein (CD86) on their surface as the co-
stimulation signal. 
§ Concentration of co-stimulatory molecules is correlated with the 
concentration of PAMPs detected by the dendritic cell [7].
DMP classifier, which is application-specific. Each agent 
must detect certain amounts of AMP and DMP to be 
activated. Once activated, it migrates to the nearest and 
publishes co-stimulation messages to nearby agents inside 
the *. In order to model the co-stimulation concentration 
(defined above), the agent uses a distance metric to measure 
how much the detected AMP is close to the training vectors†. 
Greensmith et al. [7] model the correlation between co-
stimulation concentration and PAMP affinity and the amount 
of danger signals the dendritic cell detects.
D. Modeling Cell Activation
Each agent has an activation threshold, which is the 
number of matching AMPs it receives. The agent then, 
proliferates rapidly by creating new agents ‡ . The 
proliferation rate is a parameter of our protocol and can be 
tuned by experiment. The proliferation step amplifies the 
effect of agents in immune response. During this stage, 
each agent runs the clonal selection algorithm of [4] to 
diversify the AMPs of the generated agents. This is
subsequently followed by the selection process that is mainly 
a converging process. As a result, the new agents are 
accurately adapted to similar instances of the attack.
E. Modeling Cell Lifespan
In order to maintain diversity and suppress undesirable 
deviations in population of agents, our protocol considers a 
lifespan for each agent by incrementing a monotonically-
increasing counter in each round of the protocol. Once the 
counter reaches a threshold that is a parameter of the system, 
it stops all of its scheduled tasks and simply deallocates all 
the associated memory. This simulates the natural 
programmed cell death process called apoptosis§.
VI. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the proposed algorithm, we perform 
a case study to show various steps needed in modeling 
immune signals for the problem of detecting distributed 
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks in wireless sensor networks 
(WSN). A WSN is a network of spatially-distributed
autonomous sensors (also called nodes) that monitor 
environmental conditions like temperature and pressure. 
Each sensor uses local radio connections with other sensors 
to route the captured data throughout the network to a 
specific location. Typically, a WSN consists of a large 
number of low-cost sensors. Each sensor has access to a very 
                                                          
* A simple technique might be to ask agents to record some information 
about the specific they migrate from in order to ban the malicious 
behavior.
† The distance metric depends on the classifier used in practice. Most 
statistical classifiers provide such a deviation measure to show the 
reliability of classification.
‡ For simplicity, we only consider one type of agent, which models a 
helper T cell.
§ About 50-70 billion cells die each day in human adult via apoptosis.
limited amount of energy thus; WSNs should use energy 
efficient communication protocols and have self-organizing 
properties to maintain ubiquitousness of the network.
A DDoS attack occurs when many nodes launch a 
coordinated flooding attack against one or more targets to 
prevent them from doing their normal tasks. We hope that 
studying this specific problem will help the reader easily 
apply our immune-inspired scheme for other applications.
A. Directed Diffusion Routing
Intanagonwiwat et al. [13] proposed a data-centric 
routing paradigm called directed diffusion to disseminate 
data in sensor networks. They define three types of sensor 
nodes: data sinks or subscribers are nodes that subscribe to a 
particular set of interests to receive specific data. Data 
sources or publishers are the nodes, which publish their data 
throughout the network. Intermediary nodes or relays
forward the diffusion interests from sinks to sources. Sinks 
and sources may also relay diffusion information. Each node 
has a cache of distinct interests, called interest cache.
Sinks and sources send interest and exploratory data
messages respectively. The initial flooding of interest and 
exploratory data together can build communication paths 
from sinks to sources and vice versa. Moreover, sinks can 
reinforce paths from neighbors by sending positive 
reinforcement message. Sinks may also negatively reinforce 
a neighbor path in case of better data delivery from other 
neighbors. Negative reinforcements suppress duplicate path 
and loops.
B. Attack Scenario
Wallenta et al. [22] introduced a DDoS attack in 
diffusion-based WSN called interest cache poisoning (ICP), 
which corrupts the routing process. In ICP, a malicious node 
floods the network by spurious interest messages. Since the 
interest cache in each node is finite, the correct interests are 
replaced by the spurious interests and hence, data messages 
corresponding to legitimate interests are dropped.
We perform several statistical experiments by simulating 
a wireless sensor network in ns-2 for both the normal case 
and the malicious case. In the malicious case, we assume a 
constant number of nodes are controlled by an adversary 
who corrupts the nodes by replacing their correct protocol 
procedures to induce ICP. 
To model each message (immune signal) defined in 
section V, we extract a set of network metrics based on their 
sensitivity against several network parameters. In the 
following, we describe these metrics for DMP and AMP 
messages.
C. Modeling Danger Molecular Patterns (DMP)
Danger patterns should indicate signs of corruption in the 
system. One good type of features that can show corruptions
in computer networks effectively is network performance 
metrics. Many of these metrics change significantly after the 
network is attacked by an adversary. On the other hand, there 
are many of such metrics that makes it computationally hard 
to consider all of them in our DMP feature vectors. 
Moreover, many of those metrics do not change significantly 
by the ICP attacks. In order to pick the best set of metrics, 
we run a set of experiments on a group of nine candidate 
performance metrics defined in Table 1 against 7k
network parameters shown in Table 2. We use the pk2
fractional factorial design of [12] to minimize the number of 
experiments needed, where p is the reducer coefficient. We 
set 4p to make the number of experiments small (in this 
case 8). Since we repeat each experiment 5 times, the total 
number of runs is 40.
The main goal of the experiments was to find the metrics 
among those listed in Table 1, which satisfy the following 
conditions as much as possible:
1. They should change significantly when the value of NM
changes, especially from NM = 0 to NM > 0 and vice 
versa and,
2. They should not change significantly when the value of 
NM is fixed and the value of other parameters listed in 
Table 2 change.
In the fractional factorial design, for each metric a set of 
significance levels are calculated that each level is measured 
by the proportion of the total variation in the response that is 
explained by the factor. Table 3 shows the significant values 
for all metrics under test. These values were obtained by 
running the experiments described above and following the 
fractional factorial design of [12].
Table 3 shows that only three metrics have the two 
conditions explained above (i.e., change significantly with 
the ICP attack): interest throughput, long-buffer probability,
and one-hop delay. Hence, we model DMP via a three-
dimensional feature vector consisting of these three metrics.
Based on the protocol, agents are required to use a
classifier to discriminate between safe and danger patterns, 
i.e. good and bad DMPs. To this end, we train a Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) using the a set of vectors (shown in
Figure 2) obtained from 2800 ns-2 event blocks in which 
1500 samples correspond to good samples (shown in blue)
and 1300 samples correspond to malicious samples (shown 
in red). These samples are used to train a two-norm, soft-
margin SVM with linear kernel. The figure also illustrates 
the classifier plane obtained by the SVM.
D. Modeling Antigenic Molecular Patterns (AMP)
Unlike DMPs, AMPs are known malicious patterns and 
should be used in an initial decision. In other words, they
should act as the signatures of misbehaving and well-
behaving nodes. A suitable feature that has these properties
is data throughput because it changes significantly in 
malicious nodes and does not change very much in good
nodes.
E. Results
Two major metrics of successful detection in the model 
are number of activated agents and number of activated 
agents. The expected behavior of these metrics is that they 
should increase monotonically by increasing the number of 
malicious sinks. 
We performed a simulation of our protocol in both 
normal and malicious cases to evaluate the performance of 
Table 1. Candidate performance metrics (LB: Low Better, HB: High Better)
DescriptionNameGoalGroups
LBTime between sending a data message from publisher and receiving it in sinkResponse time
Responsiveness
Speed
LBLast hop delay average in one blockOne hop delay
HBNumber of data messages received per blockData throughput
Productivity
LBNumber of interest messages received per blockInterest throughput
LBNumber of hops messages pass to arrive to destination sink nodesPassed hopsUtilization
LB
Probability that a message is delayed more than average response time along 
its way to destination sink node
Delay probabilityDelay error
Reliability
LBProbability that the send buffer length exceeds a specific thresholdLong buffer probabilityBuffer lengthening
LBNumber of messages dropped in a block due to non-matching subscriptionsData drop rateLoss error
Availability
LBNumber of messages dropped in a block due to buffer overflowBuffer drop rateBuffer overflow
Table 2. Network parameters (factors)
Factor Description
NM Number of malicious nodes
NP Number of publish nodes
IP Publish interval: Time interval between two publish 
messages sent by publish nodes.
μM Mean of malicious distribution: Mean of the ratio of the 
number of malicious interests sent each time to the 
maximum send buffer length.
NR Number of relay nodes
NS Number of subscriber (sink) nodes
∆I Initial phase difference: Time interval between two publish 
messages sent by publish nodes.
the protocol in detecting malicious behaviors. Out of one 
hundred LT nodes in ten normal runs, only seven LT nodes
on average contained activated agents and only three LN 
nodes on average contained activated agents (3% false 
positive). In the malicious case, 15 out of 100 LT nodes were 
malicious. We repeated the experiment ten times and on 
average, in 14 nodes, agents were activated and all 
agents of nearest LN nodes were activated (7% false 
negative). Figure 3 shows the number of activated D agents 
and T agents versus the number of malicious sink nodes. 
Both plots are monotonically increasing and have smooth 
exponential increase. One explanation to this fast increase is 
that each activated agent stimulates several other agents and 
hence, an exponential blowup is formed. This blowup can be 
relaxed by reducing each agents lifespan, which in return 
may increase the false negative rate. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed an immune-inspired protocol based on 
immunological danger theory for intrusion detection in 
distributed systems. Danger theory is able to solve many 
important problems in immunology that could only be 
partially explained by the traditional self-nonself 
discrimination theory. These problems often result in high 
false positive rates in immune-inspired IDS. We believe that 
using danger theory in a multi agent environment that 
simulates the natural immune system is effective in reducing 
false positive rates. In our protocol, we modeled several 
immune signals via messages that can be transmitted 
between the agents. Most messages contain feature vectors 
that must be meaningfully extracted from various system 
properties. Although we described a few rules of thumb to 
simplify this delicate task, one should consider application-
Figure 2. Modeling SDAMP signal: 1500 samples of event blocks obtained from healthy run (blue, left) and 1500 samples of event blocks obtained 
from a run with attack (red, right). The plane –1.8x – 0.1y + 0.2z = 195 resulted from training a SVM is used as the safe-danger classifier.
Table 3. Metric significance values for malicious and non-malicious nodes
Malicious Nodes Non-malicious Nodes
Metric↓     Factor→ NM NP IP μM NR NS ∆I NM NP IP μM NR NS ∆I
Buffer Overflow 0.37 0.00 0.27 0.01 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.39
Data Drop 0.02 0.03 0.53 0.00 0.18 0.05 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.53 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.31
Data Throughput 0.72 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.40
Delay Prob. 0.23 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.31 0.12 0.17 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.08 0.37 0.15
Interest Throughput 0.64 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.09 0.63 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.08
Long Buffer Prob. 0.39 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.25 0.29 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.28
One Hop Delay 0.51 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.22 0.12 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.32 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.13
Passed Hops 0.05 0.26 0.26 0.03 0.03 0.32 0.05 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.22 0.09
Response Time 0.07 0.37 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.33 0.09 0.25 0.57 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.05
specific strategies in order to extract the best features. On the 
other hand, we believe most distributed systems have several 
aspects in common and a detailed application of our protocol 
in one system can be very useful in applying the protocol to 
other systems. To this end, we performed a case study to 
apply our protocol to the problem of detecting intrusions in 
wireless sensor networks. The experiments indicate that the 
system can detect intrusions with small false 
positive/negative rates. As a future work, we are interested in 
conducting a set of rigorous experiments to find a group of 
performance metrics that can accurately distinguish 
adversarial patterns from normal ones and corruption 
(danger) patterns from safe patterns. Finally, we are 
interested to compare detection rates of our protocol to other 
immune-inspired schemes proposed in the literature.
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